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LANDLORD DISCRIMINATION AGAINST CHILDREN:
POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS TO A HOUSING CRISIS
I. INTRODUCTION
In the recent Los Angeles case of Marina Point, Ltd. v. Wolfson, an
owner of an "adults only" apartment complex successfully litigated an
unlawful detainer action against a married couple after the birth of their
child. The landlord based his action on a provision in the apartment lease
restricting tenants to persons over seventeen years of age.2 At the heart of
this case is the question of the legality of excluding tenants or applicants
with minor children from rental housing accommodations.
California presently has two statutes which prohibit discrimination in
housing, the Unruh Civil Rights Act3 and the Rumford Fair Housing
Act. 4 Neither statute expressly prohibits landlords from denying rental
1. No. A 15829 (Culver City Mun. Ct., Los Angeles County, Oct. 21, 1977), notice of
appeal filed, (Nov. 21, 1977).
2. Id. The filing of the unlawful detainer action followed the initiation of Wolfson v.
Marina Point, Ltd., No. C 201 284 (Super. Ct., Los Angeles County, filed May 27, 1977), a
case filed by Mr. and Mrs. Stephen A. Wolfson on behalf of themselves and their infant
son, Adam, as both an individual and class action. The suit sought to obtain a preliminary
injunction prohibiting the defendant landlord from evicting the Wolfsons after the birth of
their child. It also sought a permanent injunction to prevent the landlord from refusing to
rent to, or renew the lease of, the Wolfsons due solely to the presence of their child. In
addition, the suit was brought as a class action to challenge the legality of discrimination
against children in housing.
The motion for preliminary injunction was denied on June 10, 1977. The class action suit
is presently pending in Los Angeles County Superior Court.
3. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 51-52 (West Supp. 1977). Technically, only § 51 constitutes the
"Unruh Civil Rights Act" while § 52 supplies the remedies for its violation. However, the
two sections were enacted concurrently and § 52 is generally regarded as part of the Act.
See 58 Op. CAL. Arr'Y GEN. 608, 612 & n.6 (1975).
CAL. CIv. CODE § 51 states:
This section shall be known, and may be cited, as the Unruh Civil Rights Act.
All persons within the jurisdiction of this state are free and equal, and no matter
what their sex, race, color, religion, ancestry, or national origin are entitled to the full
and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities, privileges, or services in all busi-
ness establishments of every kind whatsoever.
This section shall not be construed to confer any right or privilege on a person
which is conditioned or limited by law or which is applicable alike to persons of every
sex, color, race, religion, ancestry, or national origin.
4. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 35700-35745 (West 1973 & Supp. 1977). The
Rumford Fair Housing Act is a comprehensive act designed to eliminate unlawful dis-
crimination in housing. Section 35700, which states the purpose of the Act, provides:
The practice of discrimination because of race, color, religion, sex, marital status,
national origin, or ancestry in housing accommodations is declared to be against
public policy.
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accommodations to persons with minor children. 5 It is contended by the
Wolfson family and their supporters, however, that the scope of these
statutes is broad enough to include protection for renters with children.
6
They also contend that in the absence of such statutory protection, the
practice of denying rental accommodations to persons with children
violates their equal protection and due process rights.7
The Wolfsons are currently appealing the unlawful detainer action
8
and are thereby presenting to the California courts a second opportunity
to examine the legality of landlord discrimination against children in
rental housing. This comment will discuss the three principal areas which
must be covered in such an examination: (1) the factual bases underlying
the allegations of widespread discrimination in housing against people
with minor children; (2) the possible protection against such discrimina-
tion provided by the Unruh Civil Rights Act and the Rumford Fair
Housing Act; and (3) the constitutional issues raised by the practice of
discrimination against children.
This part shall be deemed an exercise of the police power of the state for the
protection of the welfare, health, and peace of the people of this state.
5. CAL. CIV. CODE § 25 (West Supp. 1977) defines the term "minor" as including "all
persons under eighteen years of age." The term children will be used throughout this
article as incorporating that definition.
6. Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion for Prelimi-
nary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order, Wolfson v. Marina Point, Ltd., No. C
201 284 at 11, 31 (Super. Ct., Los Angeles County, filed May 27, 1977) [hereinafter cited as
Wolfson Memorandum].
7. Id. at 69-80. The Wolfson's equal protection and due process challenges are based
on the fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution and on article I, § 7 of the
California Constitution. Id. at 49-50, 74. See also note 114 infra. The Wolfsons allege that
there was sufficient state action to raise their constitutional claims since their apartment,
located in Marina del Rey, California, was on county-owned property. Wolfson Memoran-
dum, supra note 6, at 69-80. The county's acquisition of the land which served as a basis
for the creation of Marina del Rey was enabled by legislative enactment and funded by
public monies. Id. at 65, 72. In leasing this land to private parties, the county "retain[ed]
control and rule-making authority over. . . the sub-leases of its lessees." Id. at 73. Since
the Wolfsons were, in effect, sublessees of the County of Los Angeles, and since their
lease with their landlord was subject to all rules and regulations promulgated by the
county, id., it may be argued that there was sufficient state involvement to bring that lease
within the protection of the state and federal constitutions. See notes 125-29 infra and
accompanying text.
Additionally, the Wolfsons contend that the provision in their lease prohibiting oc-
cupancy by a child is in violation of the enabling and funding legislation which created
Marina del Rey since children were to be major beneficiaries of the Marina project. See
Wolfson Memorandum, supra note 6, at 65-68. See also L.A. Times, Oct. 22, 1977, pt. 1,
at 1, col. 4.
8. Marina Point, Ltd. v. Wolfson, No. A 15829 (Culver City Mun. Ct., Los Angeles
County, Oct. 21, 1977), notice of appealfiled, (Nov. 21, 1977).
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II. FACTUAL BASES
It is alleged by the proponents of "fair housing for children," 9 that in
certain portions of Los Angeles County up to 80 percent of the available
rental housing accommodations is restricted to "adults only." 10 It is
feared that such exclusionary patterns encourage the flight of families
from the cities, decrease family oriented neighborhoods and relation-
ships, and further contribute to the decline in the quality of housing
available for California's children."1 The resulting harm cuts across all
racial, ethnic, and economic levels, 12 but falls most heavily on low
income families. 
13
Although statewide statistics supporting these allegations are not avail-
able,14 local surveys and statistical information do support the allegations
that discrimination in rental housing against families with children is
widespread in urban centers. 15 Already, both the cities of San Francisco
and Berkeley have enacted ordinances prohibiting discrimination against
families with children in the rental or leasing of housing accommoda-
9. Several groups in the Los Angeles area have directed their attention to the problem
of discrimination in housing based solely on the presence of minor children. Among them
are: The Fair Housing Coalition, Toni Tarlau, Founder, Dora Ashford, Director; The Fair
Housing Congress of Southern California, Lois Moss, Executive Director; and the Human
Relations Commission of Los Angeles, Jesse Mae Beavers, Director.
10. Surveys of rental advertisements in city newspapers, compiled by State Senator
David Roberti, reveal that 80% of the advertisements for housing in Santa Monica,
California, and 60% of such advertisements for the Los Angeles area specify that children
will not be allowed. Surveys taken of newspapers in San Jose and Fresno show a figure
closer to 50%. L.A. Times, Jan. 28, 1978, pt. 2, at 1, col. 2. See also notes 19-21 infra and
accompanying text.
11. SAN FRANCISCO, CAL., MUN. CODE Pt. II, ch. VIII, art. 1.2, § 100 (1975); Berkeley,
Cal., Ordinance 4835-N.S., § I (Dec. 25, 1975). See State Senator D. Roberti, News
Release No. 32 (Feb. 23, 1977) (alleging inter alia that "arbitrary age limits in rental
housing are forcing children to grow up in overcrowded, dilapidated, unsafe neighbor-
hoods."). Id. at 1.
12. See materials cited note 11 supra.
13. Berkeley, Cal., Ordinance 4835-N.S., § 1 (Dec. 25, 1975); State Senator D. Roberti,
News Release No. 32 at 1, 2 (Feb. 23, 1977).
14. Interview with Stephen A. Wolfson and Eugene Gratz, attorneys, in Los Angeles,
California (Jan. 4, 1978). Telephonic interviews with Michael Woo, Administrative Assis-
tant to State Senator David A. Roberti, Sacramento, California (Jan. 3, 1978, Dec. 16,
1977, Nov. 30, 1977). Telephonic interview with personnel of the California Real Estate
Association (Dec. 27, 1977). Telephonic interview with Lois Moss, Executive Director,
Fair Housing Congress of Southern California, Los Angeles, California (Dec. 27, 1977).
Telephonic interview with personnel of the Human Relations Committee of Los Angeles,
California (Dec. 28, 1977). Each interviewee confirmed that no statewide statistics have
yet been compiled.
15. See note 10 supra and accompanying text; notes 19-21 infra and accompanying
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tions. 16 The ordinances are based on findings that "the existence of such
discrimination poses a substantial threat to the health and welfare of a
sizable segment of the community, namely families with minor chil-
dren."1 7 Those cities also found that a shortage of housing suitable for
families with children and a low vacancy rate in rental housing, when
combined with discrimination against families with children, created an
"untenable situation for the children."18
The statistics for the Los Angeles area indicate a situation similar to
that existing in San Francisco and Berkeley prior to their passing protec-
tive ordinances. In late 1977, the vacancy rate for rental units in the City
of Los Angeles was only 2.5 to 3.5 percent. 19 Assuming, as noted above,
that 60 to 80 percent of the apartments in Los Angeles County exclude
minor children as tenants,20 the vacancy rate for persons with children
could have been as low as .5 percent and was no higher than 1.4 percent.
Yet other surveys indicate that during this same period, 53 percent of the
families with minor children who rented their housing were inadequately
housed.21 The result is that not only were a majority of such families
inadequately housed, but the lack of suitable housing available to them
has prohibited any amelioration of the problem.
In reaction to these surveys and the possible detrimental effects of
discrimination against children, legislation was introduced in the 1977-
1978 session of the California Legislature to amend the Unruh Civil
Rights Act.22 Had it been adopted, the proposed amendment would have
16. SAN FRANCISCO, CAL., MUN. CODE pt. II, ch. VIII, art. 1.2 (1975); Berkeley, Cal.,
Ordinance 4835-N.S. (Dec. 25, 1975). With minor exceptions, the two ordinances contain
identical provisions.
17. SAN FRANCISCO, CAL., MUN. CODE pt. II, ch. VIII, art. 1.2, § 100 (1975); Berkeley,
Cal., Ordinance 4835-N.S., § 1 (Dec. 25, 1975) (relevant language identical).
18. See authorities cited note 17 supra.
19. Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power, Power Serv. Div. Individually Metered
Apartment Vacancy Survey (Oct. 8, 1977). See Appendix A, Tables I-II.
20. See note 10 supra and accompanying text.
21. Southern California Association of Governments, Regional Housing Allocation
Model, Supplemental Staff Report on Inadequately Housed Families with Children at 2
(Sept. 1977). The Supplemental Staff Report defines "inadequately housed" as: (1) paying
more than 25% of gross income for gross housing payments; or (2) "overcrowding"-
having more than 1.01 persons per room; or (3) living in a substandard or dilapidated
housing unit. Id. at 1.
22. S.B. 359, Cal. Legis., 1977-78 Reg. Sess. (introduced Feb. 23, 1977). Introduced by
Senators David A. Roberti and Peter H. Behr, the bill was defeated in the Senate Local
Government Committee on May 9, 1977, by a vote of five to two. Cal. S. Weekly Hist. 211
(Feb. 2, 1978). The bill was reconsidered in 1978 and was passed by the committee and
sent to the senate floor. Id. On January 27, 1978, it was defeated on the senate floor by a
vote of 17 to 17, four votes short of the number needed for passage. L.A. Times, Jan. 28,
1978, pt. 2, at 1, col. 1.
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specifically prohibited discrimination against persons with minor chil-
dren with respect to the rental or leasing of any housing accommodation
as well as prohibiting the advertisement or notice of any preference based
on the potential tenancy of a minor child.23
Although presenting a remedy to the problem, the introduction of such
legislation is not necessary if the present scope of the Unruh Civil Rights
Act is interpreted as affording protection to such persons. An examina-
tion of California Supreme Court case law regarding the Unruh Act
indicates a broad scope to the Act's protection which provides the courts
with an immediate solution to the problem of discrimination against
children in housing.
III. THE SCOPE AND APPLICABILITY OF THE UNRUH CmL RIGHTS ACT
The Unruh Act,24 which was an amendment to the earlier California
Civil Rights Act, provides that it shall be unlawful for any "business
establishment" to discriminate on the basis of "sex, race, color, reli-
gion, ancestry, or national origin."I Since its inception, the Unruh Act
23. S.B. 359, Cal. Legis., 1977-78 Reg. Sess. (as amended in Senate, Jan. 17, 1978). In
light of the defeat of S.B. 359, see note 22 supra, Senator Roberti has introduced a new
bill which prohibits landlord discrimination against tenants or prospective tenants on the
basis of age. S.B. 1688, Cal. Legis., 1977-78 Reg. Sess. (introduced Mar. 9, 1978). Rather
than amending the Unruh Civil Rights Act, S.B. 1688 would add §§ 37200-37208 to the
California Health and Safety Code. Like S.B. 359, S.B. 1688 would not apply to housing
accommodations designed and operated solely for senior citizens, retirees or their
spouses, "senior citizen" being defined as a person 60 years of age or older. Also
specifically exempted are (1) mobile home parks, as defined by § 18214 of the Health and
Safety Code, and (2) dormitories owned and operated by public or private colleges or
universities which are designed exclusively for use by single or unmarried students. S.B.
1688, Cal. Legis., 1977-78 Reg. Sess. (introduced Mar. 9, 1978).
Unlike S.B. 359, S.B. 1688 allows a landlord, as an affirmative defense, "to establish
that the housing accommodation is unsafe for a person of the plaintiff's age." Id. It would
therefore be possible for a landlord to exclude children if he could prove that the facilities
provided were unsafe for minors. Cf., 58 OP. CAL. ATT'Y GEN. 608, 613 (1975) (impliedly
recognizing that while the Unruh Act prohibits arbitrary discrimination by landlords
against children, refusal to rent to a family with children would be proper where motivated
by interests of health and safety).
If S.B. 1688 were passed, California would join six other states which prohibit, in some
form, discrimination in rental policies and procedures against families with children. ARIZ.
REV. STAT. § 33-1317 A (Supp. 1977-1978); DEL. CODE tit. 25, § 6503 (1974); ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 80, §§ 37-38 (Smith-Hurd 1966 & Supp. 1977); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 151B,
§ 4 (11) (West Supp. 1977); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:170-92 (West 1971); N.Y. REAL PROP.
LAW §§ 236-237 (McKinney 1968). For a comparison of the provisions of each state, see
O'Brien & Fitzgerald, Apartment for Rent--Children Not Allowed: The Illinois Children
In Housing Statute-Its Viability and a Proposal for Its Comprehensive Amendment, 25
DE PAUL L. REV. 64 (1975) [hereinafter cited as O'Brien].
24. CAL. CIv. CODE §§ 51-52 (West Supp. 1977).
25. Id. § 51. For text of the Unruh Act, see note 3 supra.
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has been liberally construed. In the early case of Burks v. Poppy
Construction Co.,26 the California Supreme Court held that the Act used
the term "business establishments" in "the broadest sense reasonably
possible,''27 and subsequent cases have held that a landlord renting
residential units operates a "business establishment" within the meaning
of the Act.28
The Unruh Act has also been interpreted as applying to forms of
discrimination other than those it specifically enumerates. In In re Cox,29
the supreme court was faced with the exclusion of an individual from a
shopping center solely on the ground of his association with a person of
"unconventional" appearance.10 Based upon the statutory predecessors
to the Unruh Act, 31 the court determined that although that Act had been
26. 57 Cal. 2d 463, 370 P.2d 313, 20 Cal. Rptr. 609 (1962) (developer of housing tract was
operating a "business establishment" within the meaning of the Unruh Act).
27. Id. at 468, 370 P.2d at 316, 20 Cal. Rptr. at 612. See Vargas v. Hampson, 57 Cal. 2d
479, 370 P.2d 322, 20 Cal. Rptr. 618 (1962) (Unruh Act applies to real estate transactions);
Lee v. O'Hara, 57 Cal. 2d 476, 370 P.2d 321,20 Cal. Rptr. 617 (1962) (Unruh Act applies to
real estate brokers).
28. Newby v. Alto Riviera Apartments, 60 Cal. App. 3d 288, 300, 131 Cal. Rptr. 547,
555 (1976) (landlord renting residential units is operating a "business establishment"
within the meaning of the Unruh Act); Flowers v. John Burnham & Co., 21 Cal. App. 3d
700, 703, 98 Cal. Rptr. 644, 645 (1971) ("An apartment complex is a business enterprise
within the meaning of sections 51 and 52 [of CAL. CIV. CODE]."); Swann v. Burkett, 209
Cal. App. 2d 685, 694-95, 26 Cal. Rptr. 286, 292 (1962) (person renting the units of a
"triplex" operated a "business establishment"). Cf. Burks v. Poppy Constr. Co., 57 Cal.
2d 463, 370 P.2d 313, 20 Cal. Rptr. 609 (1962) (developer of housing tract was operating a
"business establishment" within the meaning of the Unruh Act).
The California Attorney General has opined that the "scope of coverage of [the Unruh
Act] would include an owner of a triplex, an owner of a duplex, or even an owner of a non-
owner occupied single family dwelling who sells, rents, or leases it for income or gain." 56
OP. CAL. ATr'y GEN. 546, 551 (1973). But see Hill v. Miller, 64 Cal. 2d 757, 759, 415 P.2d
33, 34, 51 Cal. Rptr. 689, 690 (1966) (nonapplicability of Unruh Act to eviction from single
family dwelling on account of race); Abstract Inv. Co. v. Hutchinson, 204 Cal. App. 2d
242, 255, 22 Cal. Rptr. 309, 317 (1962) ("[N]ot all persons who rent their property to others
can be held to operate business establishments."). See generally Note, Sex Disclimination
in Housing, 10 Loy. L.A.L. REV. 820, 841-43 (1977).
29. 3 Cal. 3d 205, 474 P.2d 992, 90 Cal. Rptr. 24 (1970).
30. Id. at 210, 474 P.2d at 994, 90 Cal. Rptr. at 26. Cox had petitioned for a writ of
habeas corpus after being arrested in a shopping center for violation of the San Rafael
Municipal Code. He had arrived at the shopping center on his father's motorcycle and was
talking to a young man who wore long hair and dressed in what the court termed an
"unconventional manner" when a security officer approached and ordered both youths to
leave the premises. Petitioner informed the guard that he intended to make a purchase and
as he and his friend were about to do so, the guard again ordered them to leave. A
discussion ensued as to the guard's legal authority to eject them without giving a reason.
The police were eventually called and petitioner and his companion were arrested.
31. The Unruh Act was enacted in 1959 as an amendment to California's earlier civil
rights statute which had been first codified in 1897. The 1897 legislation provided that "all
citizens within the jurisdiction of this State shall be entitled to the full and equal accommo-
dations, advantages, facilities, and privileges of inns, restaurants, hotels. . . and all other
places of public accommodation or amusement." Law of Mar. 13, 1897, ch. 108, § I,
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passed primarily to prohibit racial discrimination, its history and lan-
guage disclosed a "clear and large design to interdict all arbitrary
discrimination by a business enterprise."32
In reaching this conclusion, the court examined two cases decided
under the prior Civil Rights Act, Orloff v. Los Angeles Turf Club, Inc.,3
and Stoumen v. Reilly. 4 In Orloff, the supreme court held that a race
track manager could not exclude a patron alleged to be a "known"
bookmaker based upon his reputation as a man of immoral character.
Absent evidence that the patron had engaged in some form of unlawful
conduct while at the race track, the Civil Rights Act prohibited his
exclusion. 36 Stoumen was interpreted by Cox as supporting a similar
proposition: that under the Civil Rights Act, homosexuals are entitled to
equal access to bars and restaurants and cannot be excluded as long as
they do not conduct themselves in an immoral or illegal manner.
37
[1897] Cal. Stats. 137. In 1919, the statute was broadened to include public conveyances
within its protection, Law of May 5, 1919, ch. 210, § 1, [1919] Cal. Stats. 309, and in 1923 it
was extended to "places where ice cream or soft drinks of any kind are sold for
consumption on the premises." Law of May 28, 1923, ch. 235, § 1, [1923] Cal. Stats. 485.
The Unruh amendment broadened the statute's scope by replacing the term "places of
public accommodation or amusement" with the phrase "all business establishments of
every kind whatsoever." Law of Jul. 16, 1959, ch. 1866, § 1, [1959] Cal. Stats. 4424. As
noted by the court in In re Cox, the legislature in 1961 substituted "all persons" for "all
citizens" to further broaden the applicability of the Act. 3 Cal. 3d at 216, 474-P.2d at 999,
20 Cal. Rptr. at 31, citing Law of Jul. 6, 1961, ch. 1187, § 1, [1961] Cal. Stats. 2920. Fora
complete review of the statutory history of the civil rights statutes in California, see Klein,
The California Equal Rights Statutes in Practice, 10 STAN. L. REV. 253 (1958).
32. 3 Cal. 3d at 212, 474 P.2d at 995, 90 Cal. Rptr. at 27 (emphasis added).
33. 36 Cal. 2d 734, 227 P.2d 449 (1951).
34. 37 Cal. 2d 713, 234 P.2d 969 (1951).
35. 36 Cal. 2d at 741, 227 P.2d at 454.
36. Id.
37. In re Cox, 3 Cal. 3d at 213,474 P.2d at 997, 90 Cal. Rptr. at 29. Actually, the primary
question involved in Stoumen was whether the State Board of Equalization could suspend
a liquor license on the basis that the licensed premises was frequented by homosexuals.
Stoumen v. Reilly, 37 Cal. 2d 713, 715, 234 P.2d 969, 970 (1951). The case has, however,
been repeatedly cited for the proposition that proprietors of bars cannot categorically
exclude homosexuals. In re Cox, 3 Cal. 3d at 213, 474 P.2d at 997, 90 Cal. Rptr. at 29;
Newby v. Alto Riviera Apartments, 60 Cal. App. 3d 288, 300, 131 Cal. Rptr. 547, 555
(1976); 59 Op. CAL. ATr'Y GEN. 223, 224 (1976); 59 OP. CAL. ATr'Y GEN. 70, 71 (1976); 58
OP. CAL. ATT'Y GEN. 608, 611 (1975).
While the Stoumen holding was based on § 58 of the Alcoholic Beverage Control Act,
Law of Jun. 13, 1935, ch. 330, § 58, [1935] Cal. Stats. 1150, the court was aided in its
interpretation of that section by the Civil Rights Act. In this respect, its analysis is
particularly relevant to the present discussion of the scope of the Unruh Act.
In Stoumen, the State Board of Equalization alleged that the presence of homosexuals
made the defendant's bar a "disorderly house . . . to which people resort for purposes
which are injurious to the public morals . . ..." Law of Jun. 13, 1935, ch. 330, § 58, [1935]
Cal. Stats. 1150, thus requiring indefinite suspension of the bar's liquor license. 37 Cal. 2d
at 715, 234 P.2d at 970. It was in rejecting this premise that the supreme court stated:
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Cox then held that the enactment of the Unruh Act, which amended
the Civil Rights Act and for the first time enumerated particular types of
discrimination, was not intended to limit the scope of discrimination
previously found arbitrary by these earlier decisions.3 8 The court could
find no legislative intent "to deprive citizens in general of the rights
declared by the statute and sanctioned by public policy." 39 The court
therefore held that the specified kinds of discrimination are "illustrative,
rather than restrictive, indicia of the type of conduct condemned.'
4
Since the grounds for discrimination specified in the Unruh Act are
illustrative rather than restrictive and since the intent of the Unruh Act is,
as the Cox court indicates, to prevent all arbitrary discrimination, it is
within the courts' power to determine that additional forms of discrimina-
tion are prohibited by the Act. If discrimination against children is found
to be arbitrary, such discrimination can properly be proscribed by the
courts as a violation of the Unruh Act.
41
Determination of whether a particular exclusionary practice constitutes
an arbitrary form of discrimination depends upon whether the practice
can be termed a "reasonable deportment regulation.'"42 According to the
court in Cox, a businessman is not required to tolerate the conduct of
customers which injures others, damages property or otherwise disrupts
Members of the public of lawful age have a right to patronize a public restaurant
and bar so long as they are acting properly and are not committing illegal or immoral
acts; the proprietor has no right to exclude or eject a patron "except for good cause,"
and if he does so without good cause he is liable in damages. (See [the Civil Rights
Act] Civ. Code §§ 51, 52.)
37 Cal. 2d at 716, 234 P.2d at 971. The court also emphasized that § 58 of the Alcoholic
Beverage Control Act referred to conduct and that "it would be necessary to read
something into that section before it could be construed as an attempt to regulate mere
patronage by any particular class of persons without regard to their conduct on the
premises. (Cf. Orloff v. Los Angeles Turf Club, Inc.)." 37 Cal. 2d at 716, 234 P.2d at 971
(citation deleted). The clear implication of Stoumen's citations to the Civil Rights Act and
Orloff in its interpretation of § 58 is that discrimination on the basis of membership in a
class, as opposed to conduct of the individual, is violative of the Civil Rights Act. Such an
interpretation is consistent with later court decisions interpreting the Unruh Act. See
notes 69-71 infra and accompanying text.
38. 3 Cal. 3d at 215,474 P.2d at 998, 90 Cal. Rptr. at 30. The Cox court stated: "Without
the most cogent and convincing evidence, a court will never attribute to the Legislature
the intent to disregard or overturn a sound rule of public policy." Id. (quoting Interinsur-
ance Exch. of Auto. Club v. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co., 58 Cal. 2d 142, 152,373 P.2d 640, 645, 23
Cal. Rptr. 592, 597 (1962)).
39. 3 Cal. 3d at 215, 474 P.2d at 998, 90 Cal. Rptr. at 30.
40. Id. at 212, 474 P.2d at 995, 90 Cal. Rptr. at 27.
41. See 58 OP. CAL. A'r'y GEN. 608, 611 (1975) (Unruh Act could properly prohibit
discrimination in the sale or rental of real property where such discrimination was based
solely on the number of children of an applicant and resulted in an arbitrary denial of
housing accommodations).
42. In re Cox, 3 Cal. 3d 205, 217, 474 P.2d 992, 999, 90 Cal. Rptr. 24, 31 (1970).
[Vol. I11
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business.4 3 He may therefore establish reasonable regulations to prohibit
such conduct. As long as the regulations are "rationally related to the
services performed and the facilities provided,"44 they will not be a type
of arbitrary discrimination prohibited by the Unruh Act.45
As in the earlier cases of Orloffr and Stoumen,47 the court in Cox
recognized individual misconduct as a grounds for expulsion from a
business establishrment but condemned exclusions based solely on group
characteristics or associations." The exclusion of children, based upon
the assumed characteristics of all children, would therefore seem to be a
type of discrimination prohibited by the Act.
To date, only one California appellate decision has directly addressed
the applicability of the Unruh Act to discrimination against children in
rental housing. In Flowers v. John Burnham & Co. ,49 the Fourth District
Court of Appeal upheld a landlord's right to exclude, by termination of a
rental agreement, tenants with male children over five years of age.
50
While the court appears to analyze the restriction in terms of the Unruh
Act, its precise reasoning for sustaining the restriction is unclear. The
opinion suggests two possible bases for its holding, neither of which is
consistent with the supreme court's rationale in Cox.
The first possible basis is that the Unruh Act prohibits only those forms
of discrimination enumerated in the Act. This interpretation follows from
the Flowers court's discussion of whether a landlord's right to terminate
a lease under California Civil Code section 194651 is limited by the Unruh
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. In Cox, the court found that in the absence of findings of fact from the trial court, it
could not determine whether there had been such a reasonable basis for excluding the
petitioner (Cox). Id. at 217, 474 P.2d at 1000, 90 Cal. Rptr. at 32.
46. 36 Cal. 2d 734, 227 P.2d 449 (1951).
47. 37 Cal. 2d 713,234 P.2d 969 (1951).
48. 3 Cal. 3d at 217-18, 474 P.2d at 1000, 90 Cal. Rptr. at 32.
49. 21 Cal. App. 3d 700, 98 Cal. Rptr. 644 (1971).
50. The Flowers had four children, two girls, ages one and three, and two boys, ages
eight and ten. Shortly after they moved into the 100-unit apartment complex owned by
defendant, they were given a 30-day notice to quit which gave no reason for terminating
their month-to-month tenancy. The Flowers alleged that they were given notice only
because they had male children over five years. They alleged in their complaint for
damages a violation of their civil rights under the Unruh Act, "denial of the equal
protection of the laws, deprivation of Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights, depriva-
tion of California Constitution, Article I, Section 13 rights and deprivation of other rights,
including the exercise of parental and marital rights conferred by California laws." Id. at
701-02, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 644. On appeal, the court affirmed the lower court's order
sustaining defendant's general demurrer without leave to amend as to the causes of action
alleging such discrimination. Id. at 703, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 645.
51. CAL. CIv. CODE § 1946 (West Supp. 1977) provides that, "as to tenancies from
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Act. The court noted that since section 1946 "applies equally to 'persons
of every color, race, religion, ancestry, or national origin' "52 and that
since "[n]one of these factors is the discrimination of which plaintiffs
complain . . . ," the Unruh Act was not violated. The implication of
this discussion-that the Unruh Act is limited in its application to those
forms of discrimination enumerated in the Act-is in direct conflict with
the supreme court's holding in Cox and is therefore not a valid justifica-
tion for upholding the landlord's restriction.
54
The second possible basis suggested by the Flowers decision is that
discrimination against tenants with male children is not arbitrary since
the "independence, mischievousness, boisterousness and rowdyism" of
children vary by age and sex.55 This interpretation of the Flowers opinion
is difficult to reconcile with the holding in Cox for two reasons. First, in
Cox the supreme court stated that a deportment regulation by a business
establishment will be arbitrary unless "rationally related to the services
performed and the facilities provided." ' 56 Yet the Flowers court
conspicuously fails to analyze how the exclusion of male children was
rationally related to the services performed or facilities provided by the
defendant landlord. 7
Second, and more importantly, the court in Flowers upheld as rea-
sonable the prohibition of an entire class of persons based upon the
presumed characteristics of the members of that class. This is not the
month to month either of the parties may terminate the same by giving at least 30 days'
written notice thereof .... "
52. 21 Cal. App. 3d at 702, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 645.
53. Id.
54. The confusion as to whether Flowers intended to base its holding on a narrow
construction of the scope of the Unruh Act is shared by the California Attorney General.
In response to a request as to whether the Unruh Act prohibits forms of discrimination
other than those specifically enumerated, the Attorney General stated:
In referring to Civil Code section 1946, the court in Flowers stated that this section"applies equally to 'persons of every color, race, religion, ancestry, or national
origin.' " This analysis of the court would seem to indicate a limiting application of
the Act to the enumerated kinds of discrimination. If this is what the court did, it
would be inconsistent with In re Cox.
58 Op. CAL. ATr'Y GEN. 608, 612 (1975).
55. 21 Cal. App. 3d at 703, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 645. The Unruh Act was amended in 1974 to
include sex as a specifically prohibited form of discrimination. Law of Sept. 23, 1974, ch.
1193, § 1, [1974] Cal. Stats. 2568. However, at the time of the Flowers decision sex was
not enumerated in the Unruh Act. Both the First District Court of Appeal in Newby v.
Alto Riviera Apartments, 60 Cal. App. 3d 288, 301, 131 Cal. Rptr. 547,556 (1976), and the
California Attorney General have stated that the reasonableness of the limitation upheld in
Flowers might be questioned today in light of this amendment. 58 Op. CAL. Arr'y GEN.
608, 612 (1975).
56. 3 Cal. 3d at 217, 474 P.2d at 999, 90 Cal. Rptr. at 31.
57. But see note 67 infra.
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type of regulation considered reasonable by Cox. Cox allows regulations
of conduct; a business establishment may restrict the kinds of conduct
engaged in by its patrons. But Cox does not provide for the exclusion of
patrons merely because such patrons may act in a certain manner while
on the business premises.
Flowers' approval of class prohibition is also contrary to the su-
preme court's reasoning in Stoumen v. Reilly.58 As noted above,
Stoumen held that a business establishment could not bar homosexuals
simply because of their status as homosexuals. Absent some unlawful or
immoral conduct by the person to be excluded, his exclusion based upon
membership in a class was arbitrary. 59 The same rationale should be
applied to children. A general prohibition against children, based upon
the presumption that they have certain characteristics which are undesir-
able in apartment house tenants, excludes those children who do not have
those characteristics. Such a restriction is not a reasonable deportment
regulation; it is, rather, an arbitrary form of discrimination prohibited by
the Unruh Act.
The Flowers court's failure to properly examine the validity of the
alleged discrimination becomes more apparent when that decision is
contrasted with the First District Court of Appeal's opinion in Newby v.
Alto Riviera Apartments.' In that case, the court was again faced with a
landlord-tenant situation but, unlike Flowers, closely examined whether
the landlord's eviction of a tenant was "reasonable" under the Act. 61
Newby involved a plaintiff tenant who sought statutory damages under
the Unruh Act alleging that she had been arbitrarily discriminated against
by her landlord. The plaintiff contended that she had been served with a
notice to quit solely because of her organizing activities as a tenants'
rights activist.62 After noting that the landlord operated a business estab-
lishment within the meaning of the Unruh Act,63 Newby reiterated the
supreme court's holding that the Act's enumeration of specific bases of
discrimination is illustrative rather than restrictive, and reaffirmed that
58. 37 Cal. 2d 713, 234 P.2d 969 (1951).
59. See notes 34-37 supra and accompanying text.
60. 60 Cal. App. 3d 288, 131 Cal. Rptr. 547 (1976).
61. Id. at 299-302, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 554-57.
62. Id. at 300, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 555.
63. Id., citing as authority Flowers v. John Burnham & Co., 21 Cal. App. 3d 700, 98
Cal. Rptr. 644 (1971); Swann v. Burkett, 209 Cal. App. 2d 685, 26 Cal. Rptr. 286 (1962).
But see Hill v. Miller, 64 Cal. 2d 757, 759, 415 P.2d 33, 34, 51 Cal. Rptr. 689, 690 (1966)
(holding that the rental of a landlord's single family dwelling did not involve a "business
establishment" under the Unruh Act).
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the legislative intent behind the Act was "to prohibit all arbitrary
discrimination by business establishments.' '
64
Following the lead of In re Cox,65 the court recognized that a landlord
can impose restrictions as to the acceptable conduct of his tenants as long
as the restrictions are "rationally related to the facilities provided.' '66
The court found that the landlord of the Alto Riviera Apartments had an
economic interest in promoting a "quiet and peaceful environment free
from the threat of rent strikes and . . . [in preventing] tenants from
organizing to protest rent increases. '67 When the plaintiff began to take
64. 60 Cal. App. 3d at 300, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 555 (emphasis in original). In noting that the
Unruh Act applied to "arbitrary" forms of discrimination in addition to race, the Newby
court relied upon In re Cox, 3 Cal. 3d 205, 474 P.2d 992, 90 Cal. Rptr. 24 (1970); Stoumen
v. Reilly, 37 Cal. 2d 713, 234 P.2d 969 (1951); Orloff v. Los Angeles Turf Club, Inc., 36
Cal. 2d 734, 227 P.2d 449 (1951); and Flowers v. John Burnham & Co., 21 Cal. App. 3d
700, 98 Cal. Rptr. 644 (1971). 60 Cal. App. 3d at 299-300, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 555.
65. 3 Cal. 3d 205, 474 P.2d 992, 90 Cal. Rptr. 24 (1970).
66. 60 Cal. App. 3d at 301, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 556. The Newby court stated that in
exercising those controls a landlord "might reasonably impose more stringent standards
than an owner of a busiriess establishment more open to the public." Id. at 300-01, 131
Cal. Rptr. at 556. Although the court in Newby did not clearly articulate the underlying
rationale of this premise, it appears to be based on the existence of an on-going relation-
ship between a landlord and his individual tenants-a relationship which is not as preva-
lent in the more public setting of a shopping center. Because of this, a landlord may be
more selective as to the individual tenants with whom he chooses to deal. However, it
would not be consistent with the Cox opinion to extend this to include the right to
categorically exclude members of an entire class.
67. Id. at 301, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 556. In reaching this conclusion, the court cites with
approval Flowers v. John Burnham & Co., 21 Cal. App. 3d 700, 98 Cal. Rptr. 644 (1971).
While, as noted, the basis for the Flowers holding is unclear, see notes 51-55 supra and
accompanying text, the Newby court presumed that thb court in Flowers had similarly
upheld that landlord's restrictions on the grounds that a landlord could take measures
rationally related to the prevention of property damage as well as the promotion of a quiet
and peaceful environment for the other tenants. 60 Cal. App. 3d at 301, 131 Cal. Rptr. at
556. However, to the extent that Newby suggests that prohibition of a class based upon
the presumed characteristics of the members of that class, does not violate the Unruh Act,
it must be disregarded. See notes 32-49, 58-60 supra and accompanying text; notes 69-71
infra and accompanying text.
The California Attorney General has also interpreted Flowers as suggesting that a
landlord may discriminate on the basis of sex and age in order to protect his property
interests and the right of other tenants to a peaceful environment. 59 Op. CAL. ATT'Y GEN.
70, 72 (1976). However, the Attorney General did not apply the Flowers rationale in
addressing whether businesses plagued with shoplifting and vandalism could, consistent
with the Unruh Act, exclude students from their premises. Instead, he applied the
holdings of Cox, Orloff, and Stoumen when he stated:
Specific problems of shoplifting, loitering, vandalism and harassment of other
customers of which these business establishments complain, do not necessarily relate
to the characteristics of young people or students.
To the extent that acts of shoplifting, loitering, vandalism and harassment occur
they are generally subject to and should be dealt with under applicable criminal
statutes and local ordinances. In cases where a particular store is repeatedly burdened
with acts of this type, a store may lawfully impose deportment regulations and other
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action to organize other tenants for a possible rent strike she interfered
with that interest. The landlord's subsequent service of notice to quit on
the plaintiff was therefore not unreasonable.
61
As a result of its analysis, the court did not find arbitrary discrimina-
tion on the facts before it. It found instead that the eviction of the tenant
had a rational basis unrelated to any discrimination against all tenants'
rights activists as a group or class. By isolating a legitimate business
interest which was "rationally related to the facilities provided," (main-
taining a quiet environment free from the threat of rent strikes) and by
determining that the evicted tenant had directly interfered with that
interest, the court could properly conclude that the landlord's action did
not constitute arbitrary discrimination.
The Newby holding that a landlord may take reasonable steps to
protect his property and maintain a peaceful environment for his tenants
is clearly consistent with earlier supreme court decisions. As the court
said in Cox, the Unruh Act's prohibition against arbitrary discrimination
does "not imply that the [business] establishment may never insist that a
patron leave the premises. '" 9 A landlord may properly "promulgate
reasonable deportment regulations,' '70 and terminate the tenancy of any
individual whose conduct violates those regulations. But what the su-
preme court has yet to uphold is the exclusion of an entire class on the
basis that its members have characteristics deemed undesirable by the
business enterprise.
7'
reasonable restrictions on store use, applicable to all patrons and may eject or refuse
admittance to those individuals who fail to comply with them.
Id. at 73 (emphasis in original).
68. 60 Cal. App. 3d at 301-02, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 556. The court also held that the
landlord's eviction of the plaintiff, because she was a "ringleader" in a threatened rent
strike, was not unlawful as a retaliatory eviction because it was not in response to her
objection to the "habitability" of the landlord's housing. Id. at 293, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 550.
See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1942.5 (West 1970).
69. 3 Cal. 3d at 217, 474 P.2d at 999, 90 Cal. Rptr. at 31.
70. Id.
71. See In re Cox, 3 Cal. 3d 205, 474 P.2d 992, 90 Cal. Rptr. 24 (1970); Stoumen v.
Reilly, 37 Cal. 2d 713, 234 P.2d 969 (1951). In Cox, the supreme court emphasized that a
"shopping center may . . . [not] exclude individuals who wear long hair or unconven-
tional dress, who are black, who are members of the John Birch Society, or who belong to
the American Civil Liberties Union, merely because of these characteristics or associa-
tions .... " 3 Cal. 3d at 217-18, 474 P.2d at 1000, 90 Cal. Rptr. at 32 (footnotes omitted)
(emphasis added). In a similar vein, the California Attorney General has stated that
arbitrary discrimination based on age and/or student status is prohibited by the Unruh Act.
Although "a business establishment is permitted to establish regulations for the use of its
premises by patrons . . .," 59 Op. CAL. ATr'Y GEN. 70, 71-72 (1976), the Attorney
General has opined that "a blanket exclusion of or other restriction upon students and
persons of certain ages by convenience stores and fast food outlets would [not] be
permitted under the Act." Id.
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The exclusion of children from rental housing seems to violate the very
essence of the Unruh Act. The purpose of the Unruh Act is to protect the
civil rights of all persons in California by discouraging class discrimina-
tion.72 Such discrimination has particularly harsh results when practiced
by the rental housing industry. In Burks v. Poppy Construction Co.,73 the
California Supreme Court described the effects of class discrimination in
housing as leading "to lack of adequate housing for minority groups
: . . and inadequate housing conditions contribute to disease, crime, and
immorality." 74 As described above, the practice of landlord discrimina-
tion against renters with children is widespread and there is presently
evidence that many families with children are inadequately housed. 75
It has been argued, however, that landlords have a right to choose their
own tenants and that this includes the right to restrict rental housing
to "adults only.' '76 While a landlord may have a greater interest in
choosing his tenants than a store owner in choosing his patrons, 7 that
interest must be balanced against the public's interest in insuring ade-
quate housing for its children. Under the power to promote the health and
welfare of its citizens, the state may place restrictions on business
enterprises.78 In holding that the Unruh Act applies to developers of
72. See generally Burks v. Poppy Constr. Co., 57 Cal. 2d 463, 370 P.2d 313, 20 Cal.
Rptr. 609 (1962).
73. 57 Cal. 2d 463, 370 P.2d 313, 20 Cal. Rptr. 609 (1962).
74. Id. at 471, 370 P.2d at 317, 20 Cal. Rptr. at 613.
75. See notes 10, 21 supra and accompanying text.
76. O'Brien, supra note 23, at 79. The authors of this article conducted an extensive
survey of landlords and tenants in Chicago and nearby suburbs along with an analysis of
newspaper information regarding rental housing, to determine the effectiveness of Illinois'
children in housing statute. The statute prohibits refusal to rent to persons or families with
young children and eviction of tenants because of the existence of a child under 14 years
of age. One of four reasons found for landlords discriminating against children in the
advertising of available apartments was that a landlord has a right to select his tenants. See
note 66 supra. The other three reasons were: (1) the apartments were too small to
adequately accommodate children; (2) the conditions in the building or apartment posed a
threat to a child's safety; and (3) landlords did not wish to risk possible destruction of
property. O'Brien, supra note 23, at 79. See also 58 OP. CAL. ATr'Y GEN. 608,613 (1975)
(impliedly recognizing that while the Unruh Act prohibits arbitrary discrimination by
landlords against children, refusal to rent to a family with children would be proper where
motivated by interests of health and safety).
77. See note 66 supra.
78. Burks v. Poppy Constr. Co., 57 Cal. 2d 463, 471, 370 P.2d 313, 317, 20 Cal. Rptr.
609, 613 (1962). See also Abstract Inv. Co. v. Hutchinson, 204 Cal. App. 2d 242, 22 Cal.
Rptr. 309 (1962) (in which the court stated that, "neither property rights nor contract
rights are absolute; for government cannot exist if the citizen may at will use his property
to the detriment of his fellows, or exercise his freedom of contract to work them harm").
Id. at 250, 22 Cal. Rptr. at 314 (citing Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 523 (1934)).
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housing tracts," the supreme court stated that "[u]nder the police power
reasonable restrictions may be placed upon the conduct of any business
and the use of any property . ... 80 If, in furthering the public
welfare, the Unruh Act can prohibit a landlord from discriminating
against women, racial minorities, and religious and ethnic groups, 8' it
certainly can be extended to protect children.
This position is not weakened by the argument that allowing children
as tenants would interfere with the other tenants' right to quiet enjoy-
ment82 or would cause increased property damage.83 While noisy and
destructive tenants are certainly undesirable, these characteristics are not
universally found in all children; they are applicable to both children and
adults on an individual basis. The fact that it may be more likely for a
member of a particular group to act in an undesirable manner does not
warrant excluding every member of that group. This is particularly true
where such exclusion has adverse effects on the group as a whole. There
is no statistical information documenting that the presence of children
results in any significant increase in maintenance costs. 84 Further, undue
noise or disregard for property is a reasonable ground for the eviction of
any tenant, adult or child. It is therefore difficult to accept the argument
that a landlord's right to choose his tenants should prevail over the need
for adequate housing for children. 85 Consistent with the California Su-
preme Court's interpretation, the protection of the Unruh Act should be
extended to insure such adequate housing by prohibiting landlord dis-
crimination against children.
79. Burks v. Poppy Constr. Co., 57 Cal. 2d 463, 468-69, 370 P.2d 313, 315-16, 20 Cal.
Rptr. 609, 611-12 (1962).
80. Id. at 471, 370 P.2d at 317, 20 Cal. Rptr. at 613 (emphasis added).
81. CAL. CIV. CODE § 51 (West Supp. 1977). See authorities cited note 28 supra
(applying the Unruh Act to landlords).
82. O'Brien, supra note 23, at 79. See discussion in note 76 supra.
83. O'Brien, supra note 23, at 79.
84. Interview with Stephen A. Wolfson and Eugene Gratz, attorneys, in Los Angeles,
California (Jan. 4, 1978). Telephonic interviews with Michael Woo, Administrative Assis-
tant to State Senator David A. Roberti, Sacramento, California (Jan. 3, 1978, Dec. 16,
1977, Nov. 30, 1977). Telephonic interview with Lois Moss, Executive Director, Fair
Housing Congress of Southern California, Los Angeles, California (Dec. 27, 1977). Each
interviewee confirmed that no statistics on increased maintenance costs resulting from the
presence of children have yet been compiled.
85. On similar reasoning, the Attorney General has held that
[a] blanket termination of tenancy and refusal to rent housing merely because the
tenant/applicant is eligible for and receiving public assistance benefits would not be
permitted under the Act . . . .To the extent that any tenant fails to pay rent or
becomes a nuisance to the landlord, owner or other tenants, termination remedies are
available.
59 Op. CAL. ATr'Y GEN. 223, 225 (1976).
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IV. THE SCOPE AND APPLICABILITY OF THE RUMFORD
FAIR HOUSING ACT
A second statute available to the California courts as a means of
preventing discrimination against children in housing is the Rumford Fair
Housing Act.8 6 The Rumford Act was passed in 1963 as an exercise of
the state's police power to protect the "health, welfare and peace" of the
,people of California. 87 It specifically prohibits discrimination in housing
on the grounds of "race, color,, religion, sex, marital status, national
origin, or ancestry. "88 The Act has been interpreted broadly as applying
to almost all publicly-assisted, as well as privately-owned, rental
housing.
8 9
By its terms, the Rumford Act is to be liberally construed for the
purpose of effectuating a public policy against discrimination in hous-
ing.' Yet even with this provision, the Rumford Act is not as susceptible
to judicial expansion as the Unruh Act. The primary obstacle to such
expansion is section 35742, which provides that "nothing contained in
[the Rumford Act] shall be construed to prohibit selection based upon
factors other than race, color, religion, sex, marital status, national
origin, or ancestry.
'" 91
While this latter provision prohibits the courts from creating new
categories, as is possible under the Unruh Act, the liberal construction
provision implies that a court may interpret the existing categories to
meet changing needs and conditions. By incorporating children as an
aspect of one of the existing categories, the prohibitions of the Rumford
Act could be applied to discrimination against children.
It would be consistent with the fundamental purpose of the Rumford
Act-to prohibit discrimination in housing which is detrimental to the
health and welfare of California residents-for a court to construe the
category of "marital status" as including children. On its face the term
"marital status" protects married and unmarried individuals from dis-
crimination based on that status alonef 2 However, under a liberal
86. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 35700-35745 (West 1973 & Supp. 1977).
87. Id. § 35700 (West Supp. 1977).
88. Id. § 35720. The terms "sex" and "marital status" were added to the Act by
amendment in 1975. Law of Sept. 30, 1975, ch. 1189, § 1, [1975] Cal. Stats. 2942.
89. See 57 Op. CAL. ATr'Y GEN. 546 (1973) (permitting application of Rumford Act to
all housing included within the scope of the Unruh Act). See notes 26-28 supra.
90. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 35744 (West 1973).
91. Id. § 35742 (West Supp. 1977).
92. On its face, "marital status" encompasses protection for divorced or separated
persons, unmarried cotenants, single persons and married persons. Such discrimination
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construction, it could further protect children as being inherent in the
marriage relationship.
Such an interpretation seems reasonable in light of United States
Supreme Court cases recognizing the integrity of the family unit and
emphasizing the importance of children in the marriage relationship.
Most of these cases emphasize the rights of marital privacy and the right
to control the upbringing of one's children.
In the landmark case of Griswold v. Connecticut93 the Supreme Court
held that the right of marital privacy is a fundamental right deserving of
constitutional protection from state interference.94 Within the marital
privacy is the right to make intimate decisions such as those involving
family planning and the use of contraceptives. 95
While marital privacy has only been articulated as a consitutional right
since 1965,96 the Court has long recognized that certain aspects of the
marriage relationship require constitutional protection. In 1923, the
Court in Meyer v. Nebraska97 stated that the liberty guaranteed by the
fourteenth amendment includes "the right . . . to marry, establish a
home and bring up children. . . . "98 Shortly thereafter, the court held
that parents have a right to "direct the upbringing and education of
children under their control," free from the restrictions of a state compul-
sory education act.99
More recently, in Stanley v. Illinois'0° the Court found that the
can also be a subtle form of sex discrimination where a single parent was the applicant or
tenant. See Note, Sex Discrimination in Housing, 10 Loy. L.A.L. REV. 820 (1977).
93. 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (declaring a criminal penalty for the use and distribution of
contraceptives to married persons to be unconstitutional).
94. Id. at 485-86. The scope of the right of privacy was extended in Eisenstadt v. Baird,
405 U.S. 438 (1972) (right of access to contraceptives applies to individuals, independent
of marriage). See Comment, Neither Seen Nor Heard: Keeping Children Out of Arizona's
Adult Communities Under Arizona Revised Statutes Section 33-1317(B), 1975 ARIZ. ST.
L.J. 813 (discussing the constitutionality of an Arizona statute which imposes criminal
penalties for the sale of a home to a family in violation of a valid restrictive covenant)
[hereinafter cited as Comment]; Note, A Taxonomy of Privacy: Repose, Sanctuary, and
Intimate Decision, 64 CALIF. L. REV. 1447 (1976).
95. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 435, 453 (1972). Cf. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973) (right of privacy encompasses a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her
pregnancy); accord, Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
96. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
97. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
98. Id. at 399. The Court in Meyer found that a statute prohibiting elementary school
instruction in languages other than English was a violation of the fourteenth amendment
and infringed upon the right of parental control. Cf. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205
(1972) (compulsory school-attendance law invalid under free exercise clause).
99. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925) (invalidating a state
compulsory education act that required virtually all children to attend public schools).
100. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
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Constitution protects the right of an unwed father to have custody of his
illegitimate children. In doing so, the Court made reference to earlier
cases and stated that it has "frequently emphasized the importance of the
family. The rights to conceive and to raise one's children have been
deemed 'essential' . . . and [are] '[flights far more precious . . . than
property rights' . . .
In Atkisson v. Kern County Housing Authority,1°2 the California Court
of Appeal recently utilized the above Supreme Court decisions to over-
turn a county regulation banning unmarried cohabiting adults from its
low income housing projects. Citing Griswold v. Connecticut'013 and
Eisenstadt v. Baird,'°4 the court reaffirmed that the Constitution protects
the individual "from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so
fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget
a child."5 Observing that the housing authority's ban would also apply
to an unmarried couple who had children of their own, the court stated
that the ban would "effectively prevent one of the parents from living
with and raising in a close and intimate relationship his or her own
children."106 The court thus concluded that any ban against unmarried
cohabiting adults-with or without children-violates the principles
enunciated in Griswold and Eisenstadt.1°7
Given the essential nature of the rights to conceive and raise one's
children, and the importance of the family unit,108 it would be reasonable
101. Id. at 651 (citations omitted).
102. 59 Cal. App. 3d 89, 130 Cal. Rptr. 375 (1976).
103. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
104. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
105. 59 Cal. App. 3d at 98, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 381 (quoting Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S.
438, 453 (1972)). In addressing other constitutional issues raised by the appellant, the court
found that the regulation violated the due process clause in that it contained an irrebut-
table presumption that unmarried cohabitation results in immorality, irresponsibility and
the demoralization of tenant relations. Additionally, the regulation was found to infringe
upon the right of privacy, and, since the classification involved lacked a rational basis, to
be a denial of equal protection. 59 Cal. App. 3d at 96-98, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 379-80.
106. 59 Cal. App. 3d at 98, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 381.
107. Id. After closely examining the constitutional issues, the Atkisson court
concluded that the invalidation of the county regulation was also dictated by the Rumford
Act's prohibition of discrimination on the basis of marital status. The amendment adding
sex and marital status to the Rumford Act had not been passed by the filing of the
Atkisson suit. It was, however, in effect at the time of the appellate court's decision. Id.
at 99, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 381. The court recognized that the amendment may have rendered
the appellant's constitutional arguments moot, id. at 99-100, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 381-82;
nevertheless, the court took the opportunity to emphasize the importance of the family
relationship and the right to raise one's children.
108. See also Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974) (school system's
maternity regulations held unconstitutional as unduly penalizing a female teacher for
deciding to bear a child); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (invalidating a state
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for the courts to construe the Rumford Act's use of the term "marital
status" as including these rights. If the right to have, or not have,
children and the right to raise those children are constitutionally protect-
ed, persons seeking housing should not be discriminated against because
they exercise those rights. 109
Extending "marital status" to include protection of children is not
without support from the Rumford Act itself. The categories of "sex"
and "marital status" were added to the Act by amendment in 1975.110
Apparently concerned with this amendment's ramifications regarding
student housing facilities, the legislature simultaneously passed the fol-
lowing amendment:
Nothing contained in [the Rumford Act] shall be construed to
prohibit any post-secondary educational institution, whether private
or public, from providing housing accommodations reserved for
either male or female students so long as no individual person is
denied equal access to housing accommodations, or from providing
separate housing accommodations reserved primarily for married
students or for students with minor dependents who reside with
them."'
Only if the addition of marital status to the Rumford Act might be
construed as also prohibiting landlord discrimination against persons with
minor children, would there be a need for passing a specific exception
allowing post-secondary schools to engage in such discrimination. While
it would perhaps be going too far to suggest that, in passing this amend-
ment the legislature intended to eliminate landlord discrimination against
minors, the amendment does evidence the legislature's sensitivity to
judicial expansion of existing categories.
The inclusion of children within the Rumford Fair Housing Act would
promote the health and welfare of a large segment of the California
citizenry. As such, it would not only be consistent with the public policy
underlying both the Rumford and Unruh Acts, but would also further the
statutory scheme prohibiting racially mixed marriages, stating, "Marriage is one of the
'basic civil rights of man,' fundamental to our very existence and survival.") (quoting
Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942)).
109. As pointed out in Comment, supra note 94, at 824 n.88, the invasions of privacy
which might result in the case of landlords trying to discover the presence of an illegal
child occupant would be as abhorrent as those condemned by Mr. Justice Douglas in
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965) (expressing repulsion at the idea of
police searching bedrooms for telltale signs of contraceptive use).
110. Law of Sept. 30, 1975, ch. 1189, § 3, [1975] Cal. Stats. 2943.
I1. Id. § 6, [19751 Cal. Stats. 2947 (codified at CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 35741.5
(West Supp. 1977) (emphasis added).
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constitutional protections afforded the family unit and the marriage
relationship 112
V. POSSIBLE CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTIONS
Although California statutory and decisional law provide the best
means of eliminating discrimination against children in rental housing, a
brief examination of the possible constitutional challenges to such dis-
crimination is nevertheless appropriate.
113
The primary constitutional challenge is that the practice of excluding
children from rental housing violates the fourteenth amendment 1 4 by
creating a class of people-persons with minor children-who are thus
denied equal protection of the laws." 5 Under fourteenth amendment
112. "The integrity of the family unit has found protection in the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment. . . the Equal Protection Clause. . . and the Ninth Amend-
ment . . . ." Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972) (citations omitted).
113. Due to the availability of California law as a means of remedying the problem of
discrimination against children and the preference of state courts to utilize state law over
federal constitutional law, this comment will delineate but not emphasize the constitu-
tional issues presented. For a comprehensive examination of the constitutional aspects of
excluding children from "adult communities," see Comment, supra note 94, at 817-32.
114. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. The California Supreme Court has construed the equal
protection clause of art. I, § 7 of the California Constitution to be "substantially the
equivalent" of the equal protection clause of the federal constitution. Serrano v. Priest, 18
Cal. 3d 728, 764, 557 P.2d 929, 950, 135 Cal. Rptr. 345, 366 (1976) (citing Department of
Mental Hygiene v. Kirchner, 62 Cal. 2d 586, 588, 400 P.2d 321, 322, 43 Cal. Rptr. 329, 330
(1965)). While for the purpose of this discussion the state constitutional protections will be
treated as being identical to, and subject to the same analysis as, federal constitutional
protections, it is important to note that they "are possessed of an independent vitality
which, in a given.case, may demand an analysis different from that which would obtain if
only the federal standard were applicable." Serrano v. Priest, 18 Cal. 3d at 746,557 P.2d at
950, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 366. See, e.g., note 122 infra and accompanying text.
115. In the unpublished opinion of Franklin v. White Egret Condominium, Inc., No. 76-
1535 (4th Dist. Ct. of App., Fla., Aug. 9, 1977), a Florida court of appeal held that a
condominium's restriction against children under the age of twelve was unconstitutional
as a violation of equal protection and the rights to marry and procreate. Contra, Riley v.
Stoves, 22 Ariz. App. 223, 526 P.2d 747 (1974) (upholding the constitutionality of a
restrictive covenant prohibiting persons under 21 from living in a mobile home subdivi-
sion, as it was reasonably related to the legitimate purpose of providing a place for older
people free from the noises and disturbances of children; cf. Flowers v. John Burnham &
Co., 21 Cal. App. 3d 700, 98 Cal. Rptr. 644 (1971) (constitutional issues raised but not
discussed).
The discrimination could also be challenged on fourteenth amendment due process
grounds as containing an irrebuttable presumption that all children have character traits
which make them undesirable as tenants. See Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441 (1972)
(statute providing that students with out-of-state addresses at time of application to state
colleges remain nonresidents for entire period of enrollment created an unconstitutional
irrebuttable presumption of nonresidence); Atkisson v. Kern County Hous. Auth., 59 Cal.
App. 3d 89, 130 Cal. Rptr. 375 (1976) (regulation prohibiting unmarried adults in low
income housing projects from cohabiting created an unconstitutional irrebuttable pre-
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equal protection analysis, states may further their legitimate interests by
creating and treating differently certain classes or groups of people
without violating those persons' equal protection rights, provided there is
a rational basis for the distinction or classification.1 1 6 Both the nature of
the class affected and the nature of the interest with which the state is
interfering must be examined by the courts in determining whether such a
rational basis exists. If the classification involves what the Supreme
Court has termed a "suspect class" 1 ' or a "fundamental interest," 11 it
will be subject to a more rigorous form of judicial scrutiny than other
classifications. 119 Under this "strict scutiny" approach, a classification
will be upheld only if necessary to achieve a compelling state interest.
120
The number and nature of "suspect classes" has been clearly defined
by the Supreme Court and does not yet include the class of persons with
minor children.' 2 ' However, the discriminatory practices of landlords
may interfere with at least two "fundamental" rights: the right of travel
and the right of marital privacy.122 The discrimination may infringe upon
sumption that such cohabitation resulted in immorality and irresponsibility). Cf. United
States Dep't of Agriculture v. Murry, 413 U.S. 508 (1973) (act denying-food stamps to
certain households held unconstitutional as containing an irrebuttable presumption).
While still a viable argument, the irrebuttable presumption doctrine has come under attack
as being nothing more than a disguised version of equal protection analysis. See Cleveland
Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 652 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring).
116. For a comprehensive examination of equal protection analysis, see Gunther,
Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Modelfor Newer Equal
Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1972); Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82
HARV. L. REV. 1065 (1969).
117. To date, the United States Supreme Court has found three suspect classes deserv-
ing strict scrutiny. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (alienage); Loving v.
Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (race); Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (1953) (national
origin); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (race).
118. Only four interests have been termed fundamental by the Supreme Court. Shapiro
v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (travel); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S.
663 (1966) (voting rights); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (marital privacy);
Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (procreation).
119. See generally authorities cited notes 117-18 supra.
120. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (state has compelling interest in
preserving fetal life at the point of viability); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214
(1944) (military imperative of World War II permitted exclusion of all persons of Japanese
ancestry from designated West Coast areas). Cf. Serrano v. Priest, 18 Cal. 3d 728, 557
P.2d 929, 135 Cal. Rptr. 345 (1976) (California public school financing system not shown
by state to be necessary to achieve a compelling state interest).
121. See note 117 supra.
122. It can also be argued that housing is a fundamental interest under California law,
thereby invoking strict scrutiny under California's equal protection clause. CAL. CONST.
art. I, § 7. Such an argument is supported by the fact that the California Constitution
presently recognizes more suspect classes and fundamental interests than does the United
States Constitution. Compare Serrano v. Priest, 18 Cal. 3d 728, 765-66, 557 P.2d 929, 951,
135 Cal. Rptr. 345, 367 (1976) (finding wealth to be a suspect class and education a
fundamental interest requiring strict scrutiny under the California equal protection clause)
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the right of travel by reducing the number of housing units available to
persons with minor children, thereby deterring them from exercising
their right to move into or travel within the state. 123 It may also invade the
realm of marital privacy by interfering with the exercise of the right to
procreate and to make family planning decisions such as where to raise
one's children. 124
It must be emphasized, though, that the fourteenth amendment does
not interdict purely private discrimination.125 It only reaches discrimina-
tion in which there is state participation. This state action requirement
presents the major obstacle to the success of any equal protection chal-
lenge to discrimination against children in rental housing. In the vast
majority of cases where persons are refused housing due solely to the
potential tenancy of a minor child, the discrimination is private conduct
which does not violate the fourteenth amendment. 1
26
and Sail'er Inn, Inc. v. Kirby, 5 Cal. 3d 1, 20, 485 P.2d 529, 541, 95 Cal. Rptr. 329, 341
(1971) (holding that sex is a suspect classification and employment a fundamental interest,
both requiring strict scrutiny) with San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 17-
18, 33-39 (1973) (declining to declare wealth a suspect class and finding education not to be
a fundamental interest requiring strict scrutiny) and Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498,
508 (1975) (strict scrutiny not applied in upholding validity of a sex-based congressional
statute); Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351, 355 (1974) (strict scrutiny not applied in upholding
validity of Florida statute allowing widows a property tax exemption, but denying the
same to widowers). See also Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (opinion that
sex is a suspect class requiring strict scrutiny not adopted by a majority of the Court). The
United States Supreme Court has also held that housing is not a fundamental interest
under the United States Constitution. Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972).
123. See generally Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974) (one-year
residency requirement for free nonemergency medical care invalidated as unconstitutional
infringement of right to travel); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972) (one-year resi-
dency requirement for voting in local elections invalidated as unconstitutionally interfer-
ing with right to travel); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (one-year residency
requirement for welfare assistance invalidated). The Court has, however, found certain
zoning regulations, when rationally related to a legitimate state interest, to be constitu-
tional. In Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 9 (1974), the Court upheld a local
ordinance restricting occupancy in single family residences to a maximum of two unre-
lated persons. In so holding, the Court emphasized the state interest in protecting "family
values, youth values, and the blessings of quiet seclusion and clean air . . . ." Id. In
Construction Indus. Ass'n v. City of Petaluma, 522 F.2d 897, 908-09 (9th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 424 U.S. 934 (1976), the court found that a city's desire "to preserve its small town
character, its open spaces and low density of population" was a reasonable state objec-
tive. Id. at 909. Cf. Ybarra v. City of Los Altos Hills, 503 F.2d 250, 254 (9th Cir. 1974)
(zoning ordinance found rationally related to legitimate government interest of preserving
the town's rural environment). In light of the Court's reasoning in Village of Belle Terre, it
is difficult to imagine a compelling state interest for excluding children from rental housing
where such exclusion interferes with privacy or travel rights and results in children being
inadequately housed.
124. See notes 93-101 supra and accompanying text.
125. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
126. In Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948), the Court, in addressing whether a
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In some situations, however, a state may be involved in private
conduct in a manner which is not immediately apparent. Such a situation
may arise where the state owns the property on which the apartment is
located, and the landlord is a lessee of the state.127 In such instances, a
court would need to determine on a case by case basis whether the
relationship between the state as lessor and the landlord was sufficient to
find that the state was involved in the landlord's acts of discrimination. 1
2 8
Only if a court were to so find could a fourteenth amendment challenge
be applicable.
The situation which offers the greatest possibility of finding state
action is that in which a landlord seeks by judicial action to evict tenants
due to the presence of a child. In this case, the use of the state's judicial
system to enforce private discrimination could constitute state participa-
tion and could invoke fourteenth amendment protections.
129
restrictive covenant forbidding occupancy of residential property by noncaucasians was
constitutional, stated:
[T]he restrictive agreements standing alone cannot be regarded as violative of any
rights guaranteed to petitioners by the Fourteenth Amendment. So long as the pur-
poses of those agreements are effectuated by voluntary adherence to their terms, it
would appear clear that there has been no action by the State ....
Id. at 13. But see note 129 infra.
127. This argument would be based on the analysis of Burton v. Wilmington Parking
Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961), in which the Court found state action in the discriminatory
conduct of a lessee of state-owned property due to what it termed "joint participation"
between the lessee and the lessor. Id. at 725. It is argued by the Wolfsons, see notes 1-2
supra and accompanying text, that since Marina del Rey is owned in fee by the County of
Los Angeles and leased to private entrepreneurs, who in turn sublease the property for
various business purposes, this arrangement is very close to that in Burton and would
allow the finding of state action in discrimination by a lessee landlord. See note 7 supra.
128. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715,722-26 (1961). It is important to
note however, that many courts are more likely to find state action when the alleged
discrimination is based on race rather than when other forms of discrimination are
involved. Taylor v. Consolidated Edison Co., 552 F.2d 39, 42 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 98
S. Ct. 147 (1977) (holding that "a lesser degree of state involvement is needed to meet the
state action requirement in cases alleging [racial] discrimination. . . than in those claim-
ing a denial" of other constitutional rights); accord, Jackson v. Statler Foundation, 496
F.2d 623, 635 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 927 (1975); Adams v. Southern Cal.
First Nat'l Bank, 492 F.2d 324, 333 n.24 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 491 U.S. 1006 (1974)
("[L]imited [state] involvement that may be sufficient for racial cases, does not command
a finding of 'state action' in an economic due process case."). But see Parks v. "Mr.
Ford", 556 F.2d 132, 154 (3d Cir. 1977) (Gibbons, J., concurring) (determination of state
action should be based upon the relationship between the state and the actor and not on a
judicially determined hierarchy of constitutional values).
129. The finding of state action in this situation would be based upon an analogy to
Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 20 (1948). In that case, the United States Supreme Court
found that the use of the state court system to enforce a racially restrictive covenant
constituted state action for purposes of a fourteenth amendment challenge. Accord,
Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 254 (1953). This rationale was applied to eviction
proceedings on the basis of race in the California case of Abstract Inv. Co. v. Hutchinson,
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VI. CONCLUSION
Since state action will only be found in very limited instances, the
protections of the Federal Constitution will not be available in the great
majority of cases involving discrimination against children. Consequent-
ly, reliance upon the Constitution will do little to alleviate the present
housing crisis facing families with minor children. If the practice of
landlord discrimination against children is to be eliminated, it will be
necessary for California courts to look to state statutory and decisional
law for the solution. Both the Unruh Civil Rights Act and the Rumford
Fair Housing Act provide the means for solving this crisis and should
therefore- be closely examined by courts facing the issue of discrimi-
nation against children.
Leslie Ann Marine
204 Cal. App. 2d 242,255,22 Cal. Rptr. 309,317 (1962), and would seem equally applicable
to eviction proceedings brought to enforce a landlord's discrimination against children.
Cf. Riley v. Stoves, 22 Ariz. App. 223, 229, 526 P.2d 747, 753 (1974) (enforcement of
restrictive age covenant constituted state action but no fourteenth amendment violation
found).
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APPENDIX A
TABLE I
CITY OF LOS ANGELES-INDIVIDUALLY METERED
APARTMENT VACANCY SURVEY
DEPARTMENT OF WATER & POWER-
POWER SERVICES DIVISION
Total
Total Total Number
Number Number Owner- Total Percent
of Units Idle Occupied Vacant Vacant
DATE: February 8, 1977
GEOGRAPHIC/PLANNING AREAS
San Fernando Valley 103,247 1,489 835 2,324 2.3
West Los Angeles2  63,263 767 603 1,370 2.2
Central Los Angeles3  156,622 4,998 568 5,566 3.6
Harbor4  12,201 379 74 453 3.7
Total City of Los Angeles 335,333 7,633 2,080 9,713 2.9
DATE: March 11, 1977
GEOGRAPHIC/PLANNING AREAS
San Fernando Valley 103,705 1,474 784 2,258 2.2
West Los Angeles 63,317 750 636 1,366 2.2
Central Los Angeles 156,723 4,772 571 5,343 3.4
Harbor 12,262 350 62 412 3.4
Total City of Los Angeles 336,007 7,326* 2,053 9,379 2.8
DATE: May 6, 1977
GEOGRAPHIC/PLANNING AREAS
San Fernando Valley 103,563 1,368 823 2,191 2.1
West Los Angeles 63,378 822 652 1,474 2.3
Central Los Angeles 156,175 4,141 551 4,692 3.0
Harbor 12,219 318 53 371 3.0
Total City of Los Angeles 335,335 6,649 2,078* 8,728 2.6
*[sic]
1. The cities and areas'included in the San Fernando Valley survey are: Canoga;
Winnetka; Woodland Hills; Chatsworth; Porter Ranch; Encino; Tarzana; Granada Hills;
Knollwood; Mission Hills; Panorama; Sepulveda; North Hollywood; Northridge; Pacoi-
ma; Sun Valley; Reseda; West Van Nuys; Sherman Oaks; Studio City; Sunland; Tujunga;
Shadow; Lakeview; Sylmar; Van Nuys; and Verdugo Mountains.
2. The cities and areas included in the West Los Angeles area survey are: BelAir;
Beverly Crest; Brentwood; Pacific Palisades; Palms; Mar Vista; Marina del Rey; Venice;
Westchester; Playa del Rey; Westwood; West Los Angeles; Century City; and Rancho
Park.
3. The cities and areas included in the Central Los Angeles area survey are: Boyle
Heights; Central City; Hollywood; North and East Central City; Northeast Los Angeles;
South Central Los Angeles; Silver Lake; Echo Park; Southeast Los Angeles; West
Adams; Leimert; Baldwin Hills; Westlake; and Wilshire.
4. The cities included in the Harbor area survey are: San Pedro; Torrance; Gardena;
Wilmington; and Harbor City.
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Total
Total Total Number
Number Number Owner- Total Percent
of Units Idle Occupied Vacant Vacant
DATE: June 9, 1977
GEOGRAPHIC/PLANNING AREAS
San Fernando Valley
West Los Angeles
Central Los Angeles
Harbor
Total City of Los Angeles
DATE: July 9, 1977
GEOGRAPHIC/PLANNING AREAS
San Fernando Valley
West Los Angeles
Central Los Angeles
Harbor
Total City of Los Angeles
DATE: October 8, 1977
GEOGRAPHIC/PLANNING AREAS
San Fernando Valley
West Los Angeles
Central Los Angeles
Harbor
Total City of Los Angeles
*[sic]
DATE: November 5, 1977
GEOGRAPHIC/PLANNING AREAS
San Fernando Valley
West Los Angeles
Central Los Angeles
Harbor
Total City of Los Angeles
DATE: December 10, 1977
GEOGRAPHIC/PLANNING AREAS
San Fernando Valley
West Los Angeles
Central Los Angeles
Harbor
Total City of Los Angeles
DATE: January 14, 1978
GEOGRAPHIC/PLANNING AREAS
San Fernando Valley
West Los Angeles
Central Los Angeles
Harbor
Total City of Los Angeles
104,494 1,440
63,474 600
155,740 4,036
12,276 336
335,984 6,412
105,167 1,518
63,413 843
156,118 4,305
12,656 357
337,354 7,023
106,845 1,393
63,901 795
156,442 3,781
12,792 361
339,980 6,330
107,359 1,409
64,056 797
156,488 3,439
12,830 359
340,733 6,004
108,815 1,550
64,274 740
157,185 3,482
12,899 363
343,173 6,135
109,025 1,445
64,445 694
156,976 3,437
12,910 379
343,356 5,955
925 2,365 2.3
696 1,296 2.0
643 4,679 3.0
73 409 3.3
2,337 8,749 2.6
956 2,476* 2.4
894 1,737 2.7
740 5,045 3.2
77 434 3.4
2,669* 9,692* 2.9
1,050 2,443 2.3
698 1,493 2.3
829 4,610 2.9
74 435 3.4
2,651 8,981 2.6
1,124 2,533 2.4
684 1,481 2.3
798 4,237 2.7
71 430 3.4
2,677 8,681 2.5
1,173 2,723 2.5
690 1,430 2.2
814 4,296 2.7
82 445 3.4
2,759 8,894 2.6
1,157 2,602 2.4
729 1,423 2.2
881 4,318 2.8
71 450 3.5
2,838 8,793 2.6
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Total
Total Total Number
Number Number Owner- Total Percent
of Units Idle Occupied Vacant Vacant
DATE: February 5, 1978
GEOGRAPHIC/PLANNING AREAS
San Fernando Valley 109,440 1,300 1,098 2,398 2.2
West Los Angeles 64,588 570 827 1,397 2.2
Central Los Angeles 156,878 3,264 845 4,109 2.6
Harbor 12,858 299 74 373 2.9
Total City of Los Angeles 343,764 5,433 2,844 8,277 2.4
APPENDIX A
TABLE II
TOTAL APARTMENT VACANCY PERCENTAGES*
Date 2/8/77 311177 5/6/77 6/9M 7/9/77 10/8/77 11/577 12/10/77 1/14/78 2/5/78
San Fernando
Valley 2.3 2.2 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.3 2.4 2.5 2.4 2.2
West Los
Angeles 2.2 2.2 2.3 2.0 2.7 2.3 2.3 2.2 2.2 2.2
Central Los
Angeles 3.6 3.4 3.0 3.0 3.2 2.9 2.7 2.7 2.8 2.6
Harbor Area 3.7 3.4 3.0 3.3 3.4 3.4 3.4 3.4 3.5 2.9
Total City of
Los Angeles 2.9 2.8 2.6 2.6 2.9 2.6 2.5 2.6 2.6 2.4
* This table illustrates the decreasing availability of apartment housing in the Los Angeles
area.

